After the fall of Assad in Syria, the rulers of Egypt have become increasingly fearful and cautious regarding the new government there. Egypt’s ruling elite is disrespecting Syria’s new leadership, casting doubts on their intentions, and spreading fear among Syria’s citizens about an uncertain future.
Among Arab countries, Egypt has had the strongest reaction to the changes in Syria, despite the geographical distance between Damascus and Cairo. In contrast, countries like Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar have quickly taken steps to establish relations with Syria’s new government. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have even invited Syria’s new defense and foreign ministers to visit their countries.
If the head of the interim government, Ahmad al-Shara, succeeds in establishing a new political system based on Islamic ideologies, the concerns of Egypt’s ruling elite will deepen. This would undoubtedly be a warning for Egypt’s President, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, as he harbors animosity towards Islamist groups. In a brutal military coup in mid-2013, he ousted the Islamists from power.
So far, Egypt’s rulers have not sent anyone to Damascus to meet with Syria’s new leadership, nor have they extended any invitations to Cairo. It seems that the Egyptian government has yet to fully come to terms with the situation, or they may still be reeling from the shock of Assad’s fall.
Even though it has been over a month since President Bashar al-Assad fled on December 8, Egypt’s involvement with Syria is still limited to phone conversations between the foreign ministers of the two countries.
During this time, Egypt’s Foreign Minister, Sameh Shoukry, urged his Syrian counterpart, Assad al-Shaybani, to follow a “broad political change in Syria’s leadership, preserving Syria’s unity, stability, and Arab identity, without foreign intervention.”
Recently, Egypt sent 15 tons of humanitarian aid to Syria, while Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the European Union have announced plans to provide sufficient humanitarian assistance for the Syrian people.
In the past four weeks, media personalities, intelligence, and security officials in Egypt have launched intense attacks against Ahmad al-Shara. Prominent MPs and popular media figures have written on their social media platforms, calling Syria’s new government a “gang of murderous terrorists.”
Additionally, Egypt’s civil aviation authority recently imposed a ban on Syrian citizens from entering Egypt without security clearance. This restriction applies even to Syrians living in Europe, the United States, or Canada. It also extends to Syrians who marry Egyptian nationals.
Such measures indicate Egypt’s intention to limit the presence of Syrians within the country.
From Egypt’s perspective, the shift in Syria has undermined President al-Sisi’s efforts to rehabilitate the Assad government, broken Syria’s international isolation, closed the chapter on the Arab Spring, and solidified a state of stability.
After more than 13 years, the resurgence of an Islamic movement in Syria has served as a warning to governments in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and the Gulf countries. They fear that if Syria’s interim government succeeds, it could inspire similar uprisings elsewhere.
Two major events have heightened Egypt’s concerns. First, the growing international acceptance of Syria’s new government due to its adoption of a moderate and pragmatic approach. Second, Turkey’s unequivocal support for establishing stability in post-Assad Syria.
However, Egypt’s ability to take action against Syria’s revolutionaries has significantly diminished. The first reason is that Saudi Arabia has supported Syria’s interim government. The second reason is that the fall of the Assad government has weakened Iran’s influence, connecting Syria with the interests of the United States, Europe, and the Gulf states.
With the dissolution of the Syrian army and deep-state institutions and the creation of a new military and intelligence system, Egypt now has fewer options for carrying out adversarial activities. The kind of counter-revolutionary actions we’ve seen in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Sudan would be much harder to implement in this case.
Other than playing the Kurdish card, Egypt has little opportunity to engage in counter-revolutionary activities in Syria. But Turkey has already started efforts to neutralize Kurdish groups.
The ruling elite in Egypt fears the potential ripple effects of Syria’s revolution reaching their country, due to issues like the economic crisis, deteriorating human rights conditions, political stagnation, and declining public support for President al-Sisi.
Another reason for Egypt’s deep concerns about doubts and security is that Ahmad al-Shara is someone who is hostile towards Egypt’s al-Sisi government. The current deep relationship between Damascus and Ankara further complicates the matter.
These factors have put Egypt in a political dilemma. The question remains whether Egypt will establish relations with Syria’s interim government or cautiously wait for Syria’s government to address its concerns on its own.
